KEY TAKEAWAYS:
- A feature in the October 2026 issue of SecurityLinkIndia argues that conflict now reaches corporate boardrooms without a shot being fired. Unconventional warfare, as the authors define it, works indirectly and often covertly through proxies, sabotage, espionage, subversion, cyber operations and economic pressure.
- They describe the main routes into business as state-linked cyberattacks, economic measures such as tariffs, sanctions and export controls, physical attacks on infrastructure and shipping, proxy and terrorist violence, and disinformation including AI-generated deepfakes.
- These threats rarely arrive alone, so the authors say companies cope best when they treat them as one connected risk and bring geopolitical intelligence, cybersecurity, supply-chain monitoring, physical security and continuity planning together.
- They cite NotPetya (2017), China’s trade measures against Lithuania after 2021 and the Red Sea shipping attacks of 2023–2024 as examples.
- Their conclusion is that the shift is from protecting assets to understanding dependencies, with a workable plan B ready before conditions change.
This post summarises a feature by Aayush Pandey (Threat Intelligence Analyst, Zebra Technologies, embedded through MitKat Advisory) and Junaily Dilwaria (Geopolitical Risk Analyst, MitKat Advisory) in the October 2026 issue of SecurityLinkIndia. It restates their argument in brief and in our own words; the full article is the authoritative version.
What is unconventional warfare, and why does it matter to business?
The authors open with two examples: a state-backed cyberattack that stops a manufacturer’s assembly line, and a deepfake video that shifts market sentiment at a conference before anyone confirms it is fake. Neither needs a formal military confrontation, yet either can stall operations, rattle markets, cut supply chains and damage a reputation within hours. They are careful about the term, warning that calling every hostile act ‘warfare’ makes the real threat harder to see. In their usage, unconventional warfare covers operations that avoid direct, large-scale fighting between regular armies and work indirectly, often covertly, through backing for insurgent or resistance movements, sabotage, espionage, subversion and psychological operations, with cyber and economic disruption now on the list. The aim is to weaken an adversary’s political, military and economic systems from the inside. The practical consequence for organisations is that waiting for an incident and then responding no longer works, and defences need to be in place before the threat shows up.
What forms of unconventional warfare affect business operations?
The authors point to several routes. State-linked cyberattacks can take down networks, halt production, leak data and expose intellectual property, and an attack on a software supplier can reach hundreds of its customers, including firms that were never the target. Economic pressure, through tariffs, sanctions, export controls and restrictions on banking channels, raises costs, closes markets and creates compliance problems. Sabotage of, or attacks on, power grids, telecom networks, ports, pipelines and undersea cables can cut off essential services and hold up shipments. Proxy groups and politically motivated violence endanger staff and raise security costs, and disinformation and AI-generated deepfakes can undermine customer trust and move investor confidence before a company can respond. Crucially, the threats rarely come one at a time: a cyber incident can worsen a supply disruption, which can feed into a sanctions problem.
What do recent cases show?
The article draws on three cases. NotPetya, destructive malware that hit Ukraine in June 2017, spread through a poisoned update to an accounting package widely used there and went on to cripple multinational companies in several industries; the UK government attributed it to the Russian military in February 2018, and the authors give total losses as around USD 10 billion. In 2021, Lithuania allowed a Taiwanese Representative Office to open under the name ‘Taiwanese’, which China objected to; the authors describe Beijing then imposing trade measures on Lithuanian exports and on goods containing Lithuanian components, the European Union challenging them at the World Trade Organisation, and Lithuanian exports to China falling sharply in 2022. And the Red Sea shipping attacks of 2023–2024, in which Houthi rebels attacked commercial vessels, led shipping companies to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, pushing up freight, fuel and war-risk insurance costs and delaying deliveries across global supply chains. The authors use these to argue that a diplomatic dispute or regional conflict can reach businesses well beyond the countries involved.
What are the business implications?
The authors say the damage goes deeper than physical security. Cyber operations bring lost customers, regulatory penalties, legal costs, reputational damage and operational problems that can last for months. Global trade’s dependence on a handful of maritime corridors and just-in-time delivery means a blockade or a tariff hike at a key node forces expensive rerouting, clogs ports and spikes freight and energy costs, and smaller enterprises are often hit hardest because they have fewer alternative suppliers and less financial flexibility. A delay in one specialised component can halt assembly downstream, and the problem can compound across sectors that have little else in common. In response, many businesses have reassessed their global operating models, diversified suppliers, relocated facilities, looked for alternative markets and spent more on cyber security, employee protection, crisis management and backup logistics and communications.
How should organisations respond?
The authors’ answer is to move from protecting assets to understanding dependencies. Different businesses face different exposures: a technology company may worry most about intellectual-property theft, a manufacturer about export restrictions or shortages of critical materials, and a multinational in politically sensitive markets about something else again. No checklist removes the risk, and not every political disagreement deserves to be treated as a security crisis, because overreacting is costly and so is ignoring a real warning. What helps is looking at exposure across supplier dependencies, digital access, political developments and the information environment together, and pooling the views of security teams, IT specialists, procurement managers and geopolitical risk analysts, so that a political development can be traced to a supplier, that supplier to a production line and the production problem to its likely cost. In their closing words, the companies that cope know what they depend on, test their own assumptions and have a workable plan B ready.
Frequently asked questions
Does unconventional warfare mean a company has to be in a war zone to be affected?
No. The authors’ central point is that the effects travel through supply chains, logistics networks, energy infrastructure and digital service providers, so businesses far from the conflict, and firms that were never the target, can still be hit.
Why do the authors say these threats should be treated as one risk?
Because they interact: a cyber incident can worsen a supply disruption, which can then feed into a sanctions problem. They argue geopolitical intelligence, cybersecurity, supply-chain monitoring, physical security and continuity planning have to work together.
Which businesses are most exposed?
The authors say it varies by sector, and that smaller enterprises are often hit hardest by prolonged disruption because they have fewer alternative suppliers and less financial flexibility.
Read the full article
‘Beyond the Battlefield: How Unconventional Warfare is Reshaping Corporate Risk’ appears in the October 2026 issue of SecurityLinkIndia (pages 76–78). Read the full article for the authors’ complete argument and case details.
Filed under: Threat Intelligence Special Reports
