EMEA · Mines, Metals & Minerals
JNIM blockade of Bamako · Mali · 2025–26
Client
International gold miner · producing assets in western and southern Mali
The Event
From early September 2025 JNIM blockaded fuel imports into Mali, which brings roughly 95% of its fuel by road on two corridors with no rail alternative. Tanker convoys were burned systematically. By late 2025 parts of Bamako had under six hours of power a day, and the US Embassy advised citizens to leave by air only.
What the Client Was Facing
- Convoy security became the bottleneck. The army held ~70 fuel trucks pending escort; three tankers reached site that week.
- Evacuation with the overland option closed. Planning collapsed to one airport — itself attacked in April 2026.
- Third-party drivers: most exposed, least covered. Seven mine employees and six drivers were taken hostage in separate incidents.
How Datasurfr Helped
- Monitor Risk Watch by corridor segment — Dakar, Abidjan, the Kayes axis, mine approach roads — not by country.
- Assess Mine sites, depots, staging points, expatriate residences and contracted drivers all mapped as entities.
- Decide Drawdown and charter-activation thresholds defined in advance; buffer stock held for explosives and spares, not just fuel.
- Act Two-way check-ins to drivers on interdicted roads, with SOS for personnel in transit.
Impact
- Contract hauliers brought inside the accountability perimeter
- One axis closing no longer froze all movement
- Charter capacity pre-retained rather than sought during an airport closure
“In a blockade the question is never whether to move. It is which segment, on which day, with whose escort, carrying whom.”
